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Abstract: The Affordable Care Act builds on existing sources of public and private health 
insurance, while creating new health insurance exchanges and subsidies. A potential disad-
vantage of preserving many sources of health insurance is the likelihood of abrupt changes 
in coverage or financial responsibility when individual circumstances change. This brief 
describes four policy challenges related to such changes: adjusting premium and cost-shar-
ing subsidies when incomes change; coordinating eligibility for premium credits, Medicaid, 
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program; encouraging and facilitating continuous 
coverage; and minimizing transitions between individual and small-business exchanges. 
Policy recommendations to reduce uncertainty, simplify coverage decisions, and minimize 
insurance transitions include extending coverage to the open enrollment period at the end 
of the year, generous treatment of income gains in correcting premium tax credits, and uni-
fying the small-business and individual exchanges.
            
OVERVIEW
The national health insurance reforms enacted in March 2010, referred to as 
the Affordable Care Act of 2010, build on existing sources of public and private 
health insurance.1 This strategy reduced the risks associated with reform and was 
consistent with President Obama’s promise: “If you like your health care plan, you 
can keep your health care plan.” The reform law also emphasized affordability of 
coverage and shared responsibility for paying for it.
A possible disadvantage of preserving many sources of insurance that are 
tailored to different individual circumstances is the potential for abrupt changes in 
coverage or financial responsibility when circumstances change. This brief focuses 
on the policy challenges that arise when individuals and families experience major 
life changes over a year. In particular, the brief examines the following four policy 
challenges related to health insurance coverage:
•	 adjusting premium and cost-sharing subsidies when incomes change;
•	 coordinating eligibility for premium credits, Medicaid, and the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP);
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•	 encouraging and facilitating continuous cover-
age; and
•	 minimizing transitions between individual and 
small-business exchanges.
The brief concludes with policy strategies for 
addressing each of these challenges, with the objective 
of reducing uncertainty, simplifying coverage decisions, 
and minimizing transitions among health plans and 
publicly supported programs that will exist under the 
Affordable Care Act.
BACKGROUND
By drawing on multiple sources of insurance, the 
reforms in the Affordable Care Act are projected to 
insure an additional 34 million Americans in 2020, 
leaving only 8 percent of legal nonelderly residents 
uninsured (Exhibit 1).2 Employers will continue to 
cover about three of five Americans under age 65. 
Medicaid’s share will increase from 13 percent to 18 
percent, and the new health insurance exchanges will 
cover 8 percent.
But changes in people’s lives (e.g., starting 
or quitting a job, changing jobs, getting married or 
divorced) that currently cause gaps in health insurance 
coverage, churning in and out of public health insur-
ance programs, and unexpected shifts in household 
premiums could continue to be problematic.3,4,5 After 
January 2014, when the health reform law is fully 
implemented, access to specific sources of coverage 
will be based on characteristics that frequently change 
(including family income, family size, and access to 
employer plans). The new system must be designed to 
handle these life transitions effectively, or the instabil-
ity and insecurity of the current system will persist. 
Another consideration is the opportunity for policy-
makers to promote participation in the new system by 
smoothly and generously accommodating changes in 
individual circumstances. More people will enroll in 
health insurance coverage if they know they will not 
have to scramble for replacement coverage if their lives 
change. Further, enrollment numbers will be higher if 
the economic consequences of participation or non-
participation (i.e., out-of-pocket premiums, tax credits, 
Among 284 million people under age 65
Under prior law A
ordable Care Act
Exhibit 1. Sources of Insurance Coverage Pre-Reform and Under the A
ordable Care Act, 2020
Notes: Employees whose employers provide coverage through the exchange are shown as covered by their employers; “Other” includes Medicare.
Source: Testimony Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on 
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and tax penalties) are as predictable as possible—espe-
cially for people facing a lot of other changes and 
uncertainties.
Additional reasons for policymakers to focus on 
the issue of continuity of coverage include the potential 
effects on continuity of care and administrative costs. 
Because most health insurance plans have provider 
networks, people who are forced by life changes to shift 
to different plans may also have to change providers or 
pay more for out-of-network care. Minimizing turn-
over in enrollment will reduce administrative costs for 
exchanges, state and federal agencies determining eli-
gibility for public programs and subsidies, and private 
health plans.
UNIVERSAL ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE 
INSURANCE
The Affordable Care Act brings together coverage 
from a multitude of sources to offer universal access to 
affordable health insurance (Exhibit 2). At the heart 
of this strategy are the health insurance exchanges that 
each state must establish for individuals and small busi-
nesses.6 The exchanges will offer easy access to quali-
fied health plans, with customer service and “navigator” 
programs to answer questions and facilitate enroll-
ment.7 The exchanges will maintain Web sites with 
price and quality information about plans to encourage 
comparison shopping and competition among insurers.
Individual Exchanges
All United States citizens and legal immigrants will 
be able to enroll in any qualified health plan offered in 
the individual exchanges.8 For people without access 
to public insurance or affordable employment-based 
insurance, and with incomes from 100 percent to 399 
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percent of the federal poverty level, the Act provides 
tax credits to reduce premium costs for insurance pur-
chased in the exchanges.9 People who meet income 
eligibility requirements and who have employer plans 
that cover less than 60 percent of insured expenses or 
employee premiums that exceed 9.5 percent of income 
are also eligible for the tax credits.10 
The tax credit is tied to the premium for the 
second-least expensive, “silver” plan in the exchange, 
which covers 70 percent of covered expenses.11,12 The 
tax credit limits each taxpayer’s out-of-pocket premium 
contribution to a specified percentage of adjusted gross 
income that varies with income from 133 percent to 
399 percent of the federal poverty level (Exhibit 3).13,14
In addition to subsidizing premiums, the federal 
government will subsidize a reduction in cost-sharing 
for individuals with incomes below 250 percent of the 
poverty level who purchase silver plans from the indi-
vidual exchange. The cost-sharing reduction depends 
on a person’s income as a percentage of poverty and is 
mainly accomplished by lowering the limit on out-of-
pocket expenditures.15
Small Business Exchanges
Starting in 2014, businesses with fewer than 100 
employees will be able to purchase coverage for 
employees through state-based Small Business Health 
Options Program (SHOP) exchanges, although states 
may limit participation to employers with 50 or fewer 
employees until 2016.16 The SHOP exchange can be 
separate from the individual exchange or combined 
with it. In 2017, states will have the option of open-
ing the exchange to employers with more than 100 
employees.17,18
Private Insurance Purchased Outside  
the Exchanges
Both small and large employers may continue to offer 
health insurance to employees outside the exchange. 
However, none of this coverage will be publicly subsi-
dized, with the exception of small-business tax cred-
its that will be available for eligible small employers 
through 2015. Except for new consumer protections 
that will apply to all health insurance plans, individuals 
will be able to retain the same group health plans and 
benefits from before the legislation was enacted. Such 
plans are referred to as “grandfathered health plans.”19 
To remain in grandfathered status, plans must meet 
certain requirements including not increasing coinsur-
ance or out-of-pocket spending limits.20
As before, under COBRA, employees at firms 
with more than 20 employees (and dependents) who 
would otherwise lose coverage will be allowed to 
extend their coverage by paying 102 percent of the 
total premium.21 The 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act temporarily offered a 65 percent 
subsidy to workers exercising COBRA rights, but 
the Affordable Care Act does not provide COBRA 
subsidies.22 
Exhibit 3. Limits on Out-of-Pocket Premiums 
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Public Health Insurance Programs
The Affordable Care Act also expands eligibility for 
public insurance. In particular, anyone under age 65 
with family income below 133 percent of poverty will 
become eligible for Medicaid, except for people on 
Medicare.23 States are required to maintain current 
eligibility and income requirements for CHIP, which 
covers middle- and low-income children ineligible for 
Medicaid, until October 1, 2019. The law gives states 
the option of creating a basic health plan for individu-
als not eligible for Medicaid with incomes from 133 
percent to 199 percent of the poverty level, by pool-
ing 95 percent of the federal premium credits and 
cost-sharing subsidies. If a state creates a basic health 
plan, individuals enrolled in it will not be eligible for 
premium tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies for insur-
ance purchased through the state’s exchange.24
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
FINANCING HEALTH INSURANCE
Individuals
Beginning in 2014, the Affordable Care Act requires 
all U.S. citizens and legal residents to be covered by 
health insurance. Anyone who does not comply will 
pay a penalty through the federal income tax system 
that phases in until 2016, when it will be the greater of 
$695 annually for individuals ($2,085 for families) or 
2.5 percent of household income.25 Exemptions will be 
granted if the cheapest plan in the exchange costs more 
than 8 percent of an individual’s income or for unin-
sured periods of three months or less.26
Employers
Employers that do not offer insurance and have 50 or 
more full-time equivalent employees must contribute 
toward the government costs associated with full-time 
employees receiving premium tax credits. The contri-
bution will be $2,000 for each full-time employee (not 
including the first 30 employees).27,28 Employers that 
offer coverage but have employees receiving premium 
tax credits through the exchanges must pay the lesser 
of $3,000 for each full-time worker who receives a tax 
credit or $2,000 for each full-time worker (not includ-
ing the first 30 employees). Employers with fewer than 
50 full-time employees are not subject to any of these 
requirements.
State and Federal Government
The funding of Medicaid and CHIP remains a joint 
responsibility of federal and state governments. To 
finance the expansion of Medicaid to all adults below 
133 percent of the poverty level, the federal govern-
ment will match state funds at 100 percent from 2014 
through 2016. This funding will begin to phase down 
after 2016 until it reaches 90 percent in 2020. States 
that have already expanded Medicaid eligibility for 
low-income adults will receive a phased-in increase 
in federal assistance to 90 percent. The federal match 
for CHIP will increase by 23 percentage points (with 
the total not to exceed 100%), beginning in 2016 and 
extending through 2019.29,30
COMMON LIFE CHANGES WILL AFFECT 
ELIGIBILITY FOR SUBSIDIZED INSURANCE
Significant changes in family income from one year to 
the next are common even in normal economic times, 
especially for people with annual incomes below 400 
percent of the federal poverty level. This is illustrated 
in Exhibit 4, which shows national estimates using data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
of year-to-year changes in family income for 2005 and 
2006, before the beginning of the recession in 2007. 
One of four individuals with 2005 incomes below 
133 percent of the poverty level—who would have 
qualified for Medicaid under the Affordable Care 
Act—would not have qualified for Medicaid based on 
annual income in 2006. Incomes were even less stable 
just above Medicaid eligibility (i.e., 133% to 199% 
of the federal poverty level), where premium credits 
are the most generous under the Act. Of people who 
were in this category in 2005, slightly over half were in 
the same category in 2006, 17 percent dropped below 
133 percent of poverty and would have qualified for 
Medicaid, and 30 percent moved up a category where 
they would not have qualified for a state basic health 
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plan but would have remained eligible for premium 
credits at reduced levels. The incomes of people at the 
highest level were the most stable: 87 percent of indi-
viduals above the threshold for premium credits (400% 
of poverty) in 2005 would have remained ineligible in 
2006 as well. A study that analyzed monthly income 
changes in the same survey concluded that income 
changes were likely to produce a good deal of churning 
between Medicaid and the insurance exchanges under 
the Affordable Care Act, with more than 35 percent of 
adults below 200 percent of the poverty level crossing the 
eligibility threshold in at least one month out of six.31
People at low income levels are more likely to 
work for small firms, which will add to movement 
among small-business exchanges, subsidized partici-
pation in individual exchanges, and Medicaid under 
health reform. According to our estimates, using data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, 
57 percent of individuals below 133 percent of poverty 
worked for firms with fewer than 100 employees in 
2006 (data not shown). The percentage of individuals 
in smaller firms decreases as people move up the 
income ladder: 46 percent with incomes from 133 per-
cent to 199 percent of poverty, 39 percent with incomes 
from 200 percent to 399 percent of poverty, and 32 
percent with incomes at or above 400 percent of pov-
erty. Only 79 percent of workers with incomes below 
133 percent of poverty who worked for small firms in 
January 2005—that is, those who could have enrolled 
in a small-business exchange—were still working for 
small firms in January 2006. At the next higher income 
level, from 133 percent to 1999 percent of poverty, 83 
percent were still working for small firms in January 
2006.
These statistics illustrate that many people at 
lower income levels experience changes in income or 
employment that could affect the continuity of their 
coverage and their out-of-pocket expenses for health 
care and health insurance over a year. One of the chal-
lenges in implementing the Affordable Care Act is to 
decide on a fair way of applying its concepts of afford-
ability and shared responsibility when people’s ability 
to pay for insurance changes.
2005 2006
Exhibit 4. Changes in Family Income, U.S. Population Under Age 65, 2005 to 2006   
Note: FPL = Federal poverty level.
Source:  Authors’ tabulations of the 2004 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
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76% remained at <133% FPL
17% moved 
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2% moved to >400% FPL
87% remained at >400% FPL
Of the adults under age 
65 with incomes less than 
133% FPL
Of the adults under age 65 
with incomes from 133% 
to 199% FPL
Of the adults under age 65 
with incomes from 200% 
to 399% FPL
Of the adults under age 65 
with incomes greater than 
or equal to 400% FPL
1% moved to >400% FPL
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CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING 
REFORMS FOR PEOPLE WITH INCOME 
AND EMPLOYMENT CHANGES
Adjusting Subsidies for Premiums and  
Cost-Sharing When Incomes Change
Timing of federal tax returns will complicate the cal-
culation of subsidies for people with income changes. 
The new law calls for the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury to advance credits to the exchanges on behalf 
of people eligible for premium assistance, rather than 
make them pay the entire premium initially and wait to 
be reimbursed. To help people plan their insurance for 
the coming year during an open enrollment season, the 
exchanges will determine everyone’s premium credits 
for the coming year just before the open enrollment 
season.33 Unfortunately, the timing of the credit deter-
mination means that income reported on tax returns 
will not be accurate for people with recent changes 
in income. For example, if the open enrollment sea-
son for health insurance in 2014 is held in November 
2013, then the most recently filed tax returns (for 
the April 15, 2013, deadline) will report income for 
2012. Recognizing this issue, the Affordable Care Act 
requires the secretary of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) to specify additional procedures for deter-
mining advance credits for taxpayers with significant 
income changes in 2013 and for people who did not 
AVOIDING INSURANCE GAPS AND 
AWKWARD TRANSITIONS WHEN  
LIVES CHANGE
Changing life circumstances could easily cause people 
to be confused about their eligibility for premium 
credits or Medicaid, and create uncertainty about the 
ultimate out-of-pocket costs of enrolling in coverage 
purchased through an exchange or the likelihood of 
remaining in a plan for a full year. This confusion and 
uncertainty could discourage people from signing up 
for insurance. If people who sign up for insurance face 
the hassle of switching plans because of life changes, 
they may default to becoming uninsured.
Furthermore, income fluctuations around the 
thresholds that limit eligibility for Medicaid (<133% 
of the poverty level) and premium tax credits (<400% 
of poverty) could cause abrupt changes in the afford-
ability of health insurance and health care. To avoid 
these changes, people at risk of crossing either thresh-
old will have strong incentives to decline opportuni-
ties for earning more or to hide additional income. 
Furthermore, the incentive to game the system could 
be quite different for people with identical annual 
incomes, depending on whether their usual weekly or 
monthly income is above or below the threshold. Such 
asymmetries have been observed in the food stamp 
program.32
In the following section, we briefly describe four 
policy challenges related to accommodating changes 
in people’s lives in the context of health reform. Each 
of these challenges involves issues that could make 
decisions about buying insurance more uncertain or 
difficult and could lead to gaps in coverage. To address 
these issues, we suggest some basic policy approaches 
for reducing uncertainty, simplifying coverage deci-
sions, and minimizing transitions between plans and 
programs. These policy strategies could be comple-
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file returns for 2012. Premium credits will be affected 
by changes in family size and filing status (e.g., single 
vs. married), as well as income changes, because the 
federal poverty level depends on family size.
Given the lags in reporting income on tax 
returns, people with significant income changes will 
have to go through a more complicated and demand-
ing administrative process to determine their advance 
premium credits. The burden of that process will likely 
discourage participation. The challenge for the govern-
ment in designing the updating process is to balance 
issues of fairness, administrative costs, and applicant 
burden. 
Insurance decisions during open enrollment will 
have to anticipate changes in tax credits that could 
result from future changes in income. The final deter-
mination of tax credits for the coverage year will be 
based on actual income reported on tax returns at the 
end of the year. Uncertainty about the ultimate out-
of-pocket costs of coverage could lead people to delay 
enrolling in a plan or to ignore the insurance require-
ment altogether. Either response will lessen participa-
tion in health insurance and the continuity of coverage.
In our example with 2014 as the coverage year, 
when tax returns for 2014 are filed by April 2015, the 
credits advanced for 2014 will be reconciled against 
credits computed from income reported on the 
return.34 Taxpayers with less income than anticipated 
will receive additional credits in the form of a larger 
tax refund or smaller tax payment, if they enrolled in 
a plan in the exchange. Taxpayers with more income 
than anticipated will have to pay back the advanced 
credits, as a smaller tax refund or larger tax payment. 
The Affordable Care Act limited the repayment to 
$450 for couples and $250 for single individuals with 
incomes remaining below 400 percent of the poverty 
level, but required taxpayers with incomes that go to 
400 percent of poverty or higher to repay the entire 
credit. In 2010, to partially offset the cost of postpon-
ing scheduled reductions in Medicare physician pay-
ments, the Medicare and Medicaid Extenders Act (P.L. 
111–309, Sec. 208) increased the payback requirement 
to as much as $2,500 for people approaching 400 per-
cent of the poverty level. The effective increase in out-
of-pocket premiums will be $1,800, for example, for a 
single adult initially at 200 percent of the poverty level 
who experienced an $11,500 increase in pretax income 
to reach 300 percent of poverty. Such sizeable repay-
ments could easily discourage people either from earn-
ing additional income or reporting it, or from relying 
on the advance credits in deciding to buy insurance in 
the first place. 
Cost-sharing subsidies may not reflect income 
changes. The Affordable Care Act specified that 
eligibility for cost-sharing subsidies available to 
individuals enrolled in silver plans in the individual 
exchanges “shall be made on the basis of the taxable 
year for which the advance determination is made.” 
In our example, a strict interpretation of the legisla-
tive language would use income in 2012 as the basis 
for determining eligibility for cost-sharing assistance 
in 2014.35 Implementing regulations could probably 
adopt a looser interpretation, and account for income 
changes in 2013 that are built into the advance credits 
for 2014. However, the law does not allow cost-sharing 
subsidies to be updated for income changes during the 
coverage year (2014, in this example). This could be 
especially important for anyone forced to shift from 
Medicaid to purchasing subsidized insurance through 
an exchange as a result of income gains during the year, 
because Medicaid cost-sharing is much less than the 30 
percent required by the silver plan without cost-sharing 
subsidies.
Policy Suggestions
Create special decision-making supports for peo-
ple experiencing or anticipating major economic 
changes. The exchanges could design interactive com-
puter programs and train personnel to guide people 
through the extra procedures required to update the 
advance credits and cost-sharing subsidies for major 
economic changes occurring before the open enroll-
ment season. People also will need assistance with 
“what if ” scenarios for the coming year, so they can 
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explore the implications of a range of future income 
possibilities and coverage choices on out-of-pocket 
expenses for premiums, cost-sharing, and penalties for 
being uninsured. Long before the end of the coverage 
year, the Internal Revenue Service could alert people to 
the likelihood of corrections to their premium credits. 
An early warning system would allow individuals to 
contact the exchange or tax professionals for help in 
projecting their income and premium credits for the 
year and to adjust their tax withholding accordingly. 
If people could be assured of quick and effective help 
when their economic situation changes, anxiety about 
relying on credits to buy insurance would be reduced.
Downplay recent changes in income, which could be 
temporary, in advancing premium credits. A study 
that simulated advance premium subsidies with and 
without full reconciliation at the end of the year con-
cluded that less correction is needed when income is 
initially measured over a longer time period that gives 
less weight to temporary fluctuations.36 
Err on the side of generosity in correcting premium 
credits for income changes during the coverage year. 
The same study concluded that “excess” premium cred-
its that taxpayers do not have to repay are particularly 
effective in promoting voluntary insurance purchases, 
because people who anticipate income gains are espe-
cially likely to use the extra income combined with the 
extra credits to buy insurance. Conversely, the effect 
on participation of initially offering too little help to 
people with income losses cannot be undone if they 
failed to buy insurance during the open enrollment 
season and then are not eligible for premium credits. If 
taxpayers are allowed to keep their advance premium 
credits, they will have more incentive to pursue income 
opportunities and fewer disincentives to report income 
gains.
A full accounting of government costs and 
benefits associated with reclaiming credits should take 
account of tax revenues that may be lost because of for-
gone earning opportunities or unreported income gains, 
as well as increased administrative and enforcement 
costs. In addition, reclaiming credits could have adverse 
effects on enrollment if people fear that increases in 
earnings could subject them to unexpectedly large tax 
bills at the end of the year. It could be more cost-effec-
tive for the government to reduce the stated generosity 
of the subsidy schedule slightly and forgo repayments 
from taxpayers with income gains, rather than state a 
more generous schedule and require repayments.
Coordinating Eligibility for Premium Credits, 
Medicaid, and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program
Coordination is critical for several reasons. First, 
most transitions in and out of these programs will 
occur between programs, and the variability of incomes 
near the Medicaid income eligibility limit implies that 
changes in eligibility will happen frequently. Second, 
the financial implications for families are significant. 
Medicaid requires no premium and minimal cost-shar-
ing for medical services, while coverage through CHIP 
or the exchange involves out-of-pocket premium 
contributions and modest cost-sharing. Third, the pre-
mium credits will be federally financed and adminis-
tered through the federal income tax system, while the 
states will share responsibility for financing and operat-
ing Medicaid and CHIP. The difference in federal and 
state roles adds to the potential for confusion and high-
lights the need for coordinating eligibility determina-
tion for the three programs. Finally, decades of experi-
ence with eligibility expansions involving Medicaid and 
CHIP have demonstrated that participation in public 
programs is far from automatic. Simplified eligibility 
rules, administrative streamlining, and outreach are 
necessary for achieving high levels of participation in 
the eligible population.37,38,39
Coordination will be complicated by differences 
in the timing of income considered in determining 
eligibility for Medicaid and tax credits. To better 
coordinate with tax-based premium credits, the income 
definition used to determine Medicaid eligibility was 
changed to a modification of adjusted gross income 
as defined in the federal tax system.40 Medicaid asset 
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tests also were eliminated.41 However, in determin-
ing Medicaid eligibility, states will continue to evalu-
ate income at the time of application.42 Existing state 
procedures for periodically redetermining income 
eligibility for Medicaid will continue. Consequently, 
the enrollment churning that currently occurs in 
Medicaid because of income gains or failure to comply 
with income reporting requirements could be perpetu-
ated in a new form. Families with incomes around the 
Medicaid eligibility limit may get caught in a revolving 
door between Medicaid and the individual exchange.
Policy Suggestions
Federal and state authorities should assign a high 
priority to coordinating eligibility for the premium 
credits with eligibility for Medicaid and CHIP. To 
jump-start the coordination process, the Affordable 
Care Act requires the HHS secretary to develop and 
provide states with a unified system for determining 
eligibility for Medicaid, CHIP, and tax credits for plans 
purchased in the exchange. The secretary (in consulta-
tion with the states) also must create a single Internet 
portal that identifies all public and private health insur-
ance options that are relevant for individual residents 
in each state.43 Exchanges will engage “navigators” to 
assist consumers in identifying and enrolling in afford-
able plans.44 
Eligibility determination, out-of-pocket pre-
mium calculators, portals, and navigators must all be 
designed to help consumers cope with changes in 
subsidy eligibility. Making the exchanges responsible 
for determining and coordinating eligibility across 
programs, as well as for enrollment in the exchanges, 
would facilitate more flexible and coordinated 
responses to income fluctuations around the limits for 
Medicaid and CHIP eligibility. If gaps in coverage are 
to be avoided, recruiting and retention strategies to 
increase participation in Medicaid and CHIP must be 
adapted to help encourage people who are no longer 
eligible for one program to switch to another.
It may be easier for states to coordinate eligibil-
ity for Medicaid, CHIP, and premium subsidies by 
creating a state basic health plan for residents from 133 
percent to 199 percent of poverty instead of enroll-
ing that income group in the exchange with premium 
credits. States with a state basic health plan would not 
have to interact with the Internal Revenue Service 
and federal tax policy for people with incomes below 
200 percent of poverty. These states could standard-
ize eligibility rules, benefit designs, plan selection, and 
administrative procedures across Medicaid, CHIP, and 
the state basic health plan.
Extend eligibility for Medicaid and CHIP until the 
next open enrollment period at the end of the year. 
This option would ease uncertainty and minimize 
coverage changes for people with incomes around the 
thresholds separating eligibility for premium credits 
from eligibility for Medicaid or CHIP. For example, 
people receiving premium credits for coverage from 
an exchange may not want to switch to Medicaid 
when temporary income losses make them eligible for 
Medicaid, especially if they expect the drop in income 
to be temporary. These individuals could delay declar-
ing eligibility for Medicaid with a resulting lapse in 
coverage.
Facilitating Continuous Coverage
Penalties for initially going without coverage are 
uncertain and confusing. The individual insurance 
mandate is a monthly requirement. One-twelfth of 
the annual penalty will be assessed for each month 
that taxpayers or their dependents are uninsured in a 
calendar year, although one uninsured period lasting 
three months or less will be forgiven each year.45 The 
first three months will not be forgiven if the cover-
age gap lasts more than three months, so the penalty 
for a fourth uninsured month spikes abruptly.46 In 
keeping with the three-month forgiveness period, the 
Affordable Care Act guarantees that new employees 
will not have to wait more than 90 days to qualify for 
employer insurance.47 However, the 90-day limit will 
not protect new hires who were uninsured before the 
waiting period; their gap in coverage will exceed three 
months and cause them to be penalized during the 
waiting period.
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Short-term enrollment will raise costs in the 
exchanges because of adverse selection and increased 
administrative overhead per premium dollar. 
Research indicates that about half of people who 
become uninsured regain insurance within six months 
or less.48,49,50,51 Anticipating only a short gap in cov-
erage, many people (especially younger or healthy 
people) might not see the financial risk as warrant-
ing the hassle of obtaining and then cancelling a plan 
to fill the gap. Although there is a monthly penalty 
for being uninsured, especially for overshooting the 
three-month limit, the penalty is mild. Consequently, 
without a process to make it very easy for healthy 
people to fill short gaps (or without harsher penalties 
for being uninsured), the people who are motivated to 
obtain short-term coverage through the exchange will 
mostly be unhealthy. This form of adverse selection will 
raise premiums and the cost of premium credits in the 
exchanges, as will the high administrative costs associ-
ated with rapid turnover among exchange enrollees.
Policy Suggestions 
Simplify the exemption for short gaps in coverage, 
so there is no doubt about the number of uninsured 
months (if any) that will be forgiven each year. When 
initially contemplating a gap in coverage, people may 
discount the possibility of being penalized after three 
months. In addition, they cannot do anything about the 
earlier uninsured months when they face the retroac-
tive penalty at four months. As a result, the retroactive 
penalty may do little to discourage uninsured gaps. By 
the same reasoning, monitoring gaps across tax years 
may do little to discourage gaps, but will add adminis-
trative cost and complexity to the enforcement of the 
individual coverage requirement.
Allow and encourage extensions of existing coverage, 
rather than expect people to default to the individual 
exchange to fill short gaps. The federal COBRA law, 
as well as state laws extending COBRA to smaller 
employers, allows the continuation of employment-
based insurance to workers and their families who 
lose their jobs and, consequently, their health benefits. 
However, to make COBRA extensions appealing to 
workers who have left their jobs, the federal govern-
ment would likely need to offer premium tax credits to 
offset the loss of employer premium contributions. For 
public insurance, there is precedent for coverage exten-
sions. For instance, “transitional medical assistance” 
allows otherwise ineligible Medicaid enrollees with 
new earnings or child support to continue in the pro-
gram for an additional four to 12 months.52
Guarantee a full year of coverage from the public 
or private plan that each person chooses during the 
open enrollment period, with adjustments in financ-
ing to reflect life changes. This approach would 
synchronize coverage extensions with the annual rede-
termination of eligibility for premium subsidies and 
public insurance during the open enrollment season, 
so that most coverage changes would occur between 
calendar years. Eliminating enrollment changes during 
the year would reduce administrative costs and adverse 
selection, thereby reducing premiums and government 
program costs.
The administrative mechanisms for financ-
ing coverage extensions to the end of the year could 
draw on existing precedents for sharing premium costs 
between employers and Medicaid (i.e., Medicaid “pre-
mium assistance”) or subsidizing COBRA. The pay-
ments required from employers with employees in the 
exchange could be prorated as contributions toward 
coverage extended to the end of the year.
Minimizing Transitions Between Individual 
and Small Business Exchanges
There is likely to be a lot of movement between the 
separate exchanges for individuals and small busi-
nesses. Employees of small firms who lose their jobs 
will have to transition to the individual exchange and 
will likely apply for premium credits. Individuals who 
start new jobs with small firms that offer health insur-
ance will often come from the individual exchange. 
Because the creation of separate exchanges results in 
separate risk pools, it creates the potential for much 
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higher premiums for individuals than for employees 
of small firms. As a result, job changes may cause big 
changes in family out-of-pocket premiums.
Policy Suggestions
Make the exchanges as large as possible by draw-
ing individuals and small businesses into a unified 
exchange and encouraging small employers to join. 
Within a unified exchange, people would retain cover-
age through the same insurers and plans when mov-
ing in and out of jobs with small employers in the 
exchange. The total cost of the coverage would remain 
the same, although the out-of-pocket contribution 
might change, depending on the amount of employer 
premium contributions compared with premium 
credits. A unified exchange would be well-positioned 
to counsel households facing changes in their out-of-
pocket costs because of changes in employment, as 
well as to facilitate a quick and smooth change in the 
financing of the rest of the premium by employers or 
government sources.
In addition, administrative costs for states and 
insurers would be reduced by unifying the exchanges. 
State expenses related to managing the exchanges 
would be less, and employment changes would not 
require insurers to add or remove people from their 
enrollment records. Even the billing for premiums 
would be simpler, since the same exchange would be 
responsible for collecting and distributing premiums to 
all insurers.
Creating a single exchange that encompassed 
as many individuals and small firms as possible 
would reduce adverse selection against the individual 
exchange, which will be the insurer of last resort in the 
reformed system. Minimizing adverse selection will 
reduce premiums by reducing insurer risk; lower premi-
ums in the exchange that serves individuals will reduce 
federal expenditures for premium credits.
Provide broad access to the same insurance plans 
through different sources. Even if the two exchanges 
are not combined, states could smooth transitions 
between the exchanges by ensuring plenty of overlap 
in the health plans offered by each exchange. In this 
scenario, people who chose plans available in both 
exchanges could move between exchanges without 
changing plans.
The same strategy could be applied in contract-
ing with private plans to serve the populations enrolled 
in CHIP or Medicaid. Exchanges could be required 
to offer at least one of the health plans contracting 
with Medicaid or CHIP, or plans contracting with 
Medicaid or CHIP could be required to participate in 
the exchanges. Although most large employers are self-
insured and their health plans do not correspond to 
plans offered in the small-group or individual markets, 
states could require health plans that contract as third-
party administrators of self-insured firms to offer plans 
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CONCLUSIONS
Because the Affordable Care Act leaves many details 
to be specified by the executive branch, a number of 
the policy recommendations suggested here could be 
implemented in federal regulations or administrative 
policies over the next several years (Exhibit 5). Other 
suggestions could be implemented by states under 
options already available under the Act or existing 
Medicaid and CHIP policies. A few suggestions (e.g., 
simplifying the exemption for short gaps in cover-
age, reconsidering the payback of advanced credits, 
subsidizing COBRA extensions with premium cred-
its) would require new federal legislation. Yet through 
regulations, administrative policies, and existing state 
options, the states and the federal government have 
the ability to smooth many transitions in coverage 
and financial responsibility from one open enrollment 
season to the next. In terms of administrative cost and 
complexity, the best way to ease transitions may be to 
eliminate them entirely, by postponing most changes 
in coverage and financial responsibility until the next 
open enrollment season’s choices go into effect.
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As they try to recover from the economic reces-
sion, Americans are acutely aware of the uncertainties 
of life; many are anxious about their future employ-
ment and income prospects. As national reform is 
implemented, procedures and policies should be devel-
oped for managing life changes that will help to insu-
late health and health insurance from other economic 
uncertainties. This will involve policies for handling 
the effects of economic gains, as well as losses. Many 
economists do not expect a substantial reduction in the 
unemployment rate for several years, around the time 
the Affordable Care Act goes into full effect. Most 
people who are still unemployed or underemployed at 
that point will have incomes below 400 percent of the 
federal poverty level and will qualify for health insur-
ance premium subsidies through tax credits, or will  
be eligible for Medicaid or CHIP. If and when their 
circumstances improve, they may resent abrupt cuts  
in their subsidies that penalize their economic efforts 
and make it harder to recover from the losses they  
have suffered.
To achieve high rates of enrollment in the 
exchanges, as well as almost universal participation 
among people eligible for Medicaid and CHIP, the 
implementation of the new law must take the guess-
work and uncertainty out of health insurance decisions. 
The success of the new law depends on creating finan-
cial and administrative mechanisms that will coordinate 
the availability of subsidized coverage through indi-
vidual exchanges, Medicaid, and CHIP when incomes 
change, while leaving little doubt about the costs and 
benefits of signing up for insurance or going without it. 
Government officials and citizens are understandably 
concerned about the overall cost of insurance subsidies. 
Even so, erring on the side of generosity and stability in 
guaranteeing affordable coverage will increase enroll-
ment in health insurance and encourage the successful 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act.
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